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MUNICIPAL RECOVERY OF NATURAL RESOURCE 
DAMAGES UNDER CERCLA 
Michael J. Wittke* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen increased concern over the country's natu-
ral resources.! From the controversy over the spotted owl to the 
Exxon Valdez disaster, society is becoming more aware of the fragility 
of the environment and of the limited natural resources available for 
exploitation.2 As this concern increases, society will turn to the coun-
try's environmental laws to protect what is left and restore what has 
been lost. Accordingly, litigation over the recovery for natural re-
source damages is, and will continue to be, an emerging area of 
environmentallaw.3 Future questions in these cases that need reso-
lution include not only how to value the natural resource, but also who 
has standing to bring such an action.4 
There are state environmental laws and common law claims such 
as nuisance and negligence under which natural resource damage 
actions can be brought.5 On the federal level there are three major 
* Production Editor, Articles Editor 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AF-
FAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See, e.g., Terry Fox, Natural Resource Damages: The New Frontier of Environmental 
Litigation, 34 S. TEx. L.J. 521, 522 (1993). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. at 521-22. 
4 See Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering 
Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 
494 (1994); see also Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using 
Contingent Valuation To Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 881 (1994). 
5 See, e.g., Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Minn. 1990) (plaintiffs brought 
actions in nuisance, trespass, and other common law claims as well as under Minnesota state 
environmental laws). 
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environmental laws that provide for the recovery of natural resource 
damages: the Clean Water Act, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA).6 
Standing under these federal laws depends not only on the law but 
on which specific provision of the law is being utilized.7 The federal 
government and the states clearly have standing under these laws 
and, where the resource is publicly owned, usually the state or fed-
eral government brings suit.8 The standing of political subdivisions of 
states, such as municipalities,9 however, has been less clear. In most 
major federal environmental statutes, municipalities are considered 
"citizens" for the purposes of the citizen suit provisions contained in 
those statutes.lO For example, a municipality would be able to sue for 
an injunction against a violator of discharge limitations under the 
Clean Water ActY Although municipalities have on occasion brought 
actions for natural resource damages as well, these actions usually are 
confined to common law claims.12 Furthermore, in recent years natural 
resource damage claims under CERCLA have been limited to state 
and federal governments.13 
This Comment examines the natural resource damages provision of 
CERCLAI4 and, having discussed the ability of political subdivisions 
of a state to recover under CERCLA, argues that municipalities 
should not be denied standing. Section II provides a brief background 
6 Respectively, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988); the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 
U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. v 1993); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
7 See infra notes 150--U5 and accompanying text. 
S See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Puerto 
Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1980), cen. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1982). 
9 The word "municipality" is intended to include cities, towns, townships, boroughs, and 
villages. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (6th ed. 1990). The ideas presented, however, could 
be extended to include any political subdivision of a state. 
10 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-
8(d) (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); Energy Sources Development 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(e) (1988); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1988); 
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988); Power 
Plant and Industrial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8435 (1988); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124 (1988). But see Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 276 
(E.D.N.C. 1981) (holding county did not have standing to sue under the citizen suit provision of 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1988». 
11 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
12 See, e.g., Davey Compressor Co. v. City of Delray Beach, 639 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 1994). 
13 See, e.g., City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 652 (N.D. Ohio 
1993). 
1442 U.S.C. § 9607(f). 
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of CERCLA. Section III examines the cases decided under CERCLA 
prior to the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA). Section IV describes the language of the 1986 amendments 
as it pertains to natural resource damages and the relevant legislative 
history of the amendments. Section V analyzes the standing of mu-
nicipalities to sue for natural resource damages after the 1986 amend-
ments and how the courts interpreted the SARA amendments as 
changing the ability of municipalities to recover natural resource 
damages. Section VI describes how municipalities have been treated 
under other provisions of CERCLA as well as other federal environ-
mental laws. Finally, Section VII compares the advantages and dis-
advantages of municipal recovery under, and enforcement of, the 
natural resource damages provisions of CERCLA. Section VII then 
recommends that municipalities have standing to recover natural re-
source damages on their own. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CERCLA 
Congress created CERCLA to deal with society's ever increasing 
problem of cleaning up hazardous waste.15 CERCLA commands that 
the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) designate hazardous substances which, if released, 
present a "substantial danger" to the public or the environment.16 The 
EPA also must state the quantity at which a release of hazardous 
substances becomes a threat that requires reporting.17 Response and 
cleanup of a site where a release has occurred must be in accordance 
with the National Contingency Plan (NCP).18 The NCP calls for meth-
ods of discovering and investigating hazardous substance releases and 
disposaU9 The NCP also requires methods for evaluating and reme-
dying releases, including the appropriate extent of the remedy used.20 
CERCLA evidences a desire favoring response actions that are cost 
effective and that implement permanent, rather than temporary, so-
lutions.21 
15 See 132 CONGo REC. S14909 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bentsen). 
16 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602. 
17 [d. 
18 [d. § 9605. 
19 [d. 
20 [d. 
21 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9621(a)-(b)(1). 
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The NCP includes a system to prioritize hazardous sites across the 
country.22 Called the Hazard Ranking System (HRS), its purpose is to 
ensure that sites presenting the greatest threat to health or the 
environment are cleaned first.23 Among other things, the HRS should 
take into account the size of the population at risk, the hazard poten-
tial of the substances released, the potential for contaminating ground-
water used for drinking, and the potential for human contact with the 
hazardous substance.24 Based on the HRS, a list of the sites that 
appear to be the most hazardous, called the National Priorities List 
(NPL), is compiled.25 CERCLA called for an initial NPL of at least 
400 sites with each state designating its highest priority site.26 
Where the government, or some other person, spends money to 
clean up a hazardous site, that party may draw on a fund established 
by CERCLA----eommonly known as the SuperfundP Superfund money, 
however, can be used only to pay for cleanup costs that are consistent 
with the NCP.28 As enacted, CERCLA provides that $8.5 billion be 
placed in the Superfund.29 Most of the money for the Superfund comes 
from a broad-based tax on large corporations and taxes on chemical 
feedstocks and oil.30 The government also may try to recover money 
from potentially responsible parties (PRPs), who are thought to be 
responsible for the release of a hazardous substance.31 
Under CERCLA's liability provision, PRPs include owners and 
operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, transporters 
of hazardous substances, and generators of hazardous substances.32 
Among other things, PRPs may be liable for the costs of removal, 
response, and health assessment studies required to cope with the 
hazardous release.33 CERCLA also contains specified defenses a PRP 
may raise, for example, that the release was caused by an act of God.34 
22 [d. § 9605(a)(8)(A). 
23 See id; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.1105 App. A (1994). 
24 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(2). 
25 [d. § 9605(a)(8)(B); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.74 App. B. 
26 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. 
27 [d. § 9611(a). 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
30 See 132 CONGo REC. SI4908--09 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bentsen). 
31 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
32 [d. § 9607(a). 
33 [d. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-{D). 
34 [d. § 9607(b). 
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In addition to these potential costs, CERCLA includes mechanisms 
for restoring natural resources that have been destroyed as a result 
of hazardous waste dumping and discharges.35 Subject to certain ex-
emptions,36 those responsible for destroying natural resources will be 
liable for the costs of replacing or restoring those resources.37 CER-
CLA commands that money recovered for damages to natural resources 
be used only for restoring or replacing what was lost.38 This Comment 
focuses on this natural resource damages provision of CERCLA. 
III. STANDING OF MUNICIPALITIES UNDER CERCLA 
Prior to 1986, when CERCLA was amended, the provision for 
actions involving damage to natural resources39 provided that those 
responsible for the destruction of natural resources would be liable to 
the federal government and the government of the state in which the 
damage occurred.40 On its face, this provision did not seem to permit 
political subdivisions of a state to bring an action for natural resource 
damages.41 The first court to consider whether a municipality could 
bring an action under this provision, however, decided that munici-
palities were not precluded from bringing suit.42 In Mayor of Boonton 
v. Drew Chemical Corp., the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey allowed the town of Boonton to bring an action 
for natural resource damages originating from the chemical waste 
contamination of a town park.43 The court began by examining the 
definition of "state" contained within CERCLA.44 The court held that 
35 [d. § 9607. 
36 For example, where the person being charged demonstrated that the loss of natural re-
sources were identified as an "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of natural resources 
in an environmental impact statement ... and the decision to grant a permit or license author-
izes such commitment ... and the facility or project was otherwise operating within the terms 
of its permit or license .... " CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). 
37 [d. 
38 [d. 
39 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1983). 
40 CERCLA provides that, "[iJn the case of an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources ... liability shall be to the United States Government and to any State for natural 
resources within the State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such 
State." [d. 
41 See id. 
42 See Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chern. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.N.J. 1985). 
43 [d. 
44 [d. at 666. The definition was, "United States and State include the several States of the 
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American 
Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and 
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because the definition was inclusive it did not follow that Congress 
necessarily intended to exclude municipalities.45 That is, CERCLA 
declared that the word "state" shall "include" the entities listed in the 
definition.46 The word "include" implies that other entities are includ-
able in the definition even if not specifically listed.47 Therefore, the list 
of entities in the definition of "state" was composed of illustrations 
and was not meant to be exhaustive.48 The court concluded that rea-
sonable expansions to the definition, such as allowing for municipali-
ties, could be made.49 The court supported its conclusion by pointing 
to other statutes where Congress has defined "state" to include po-
litical subdivisions of states, such as municipalities.50 
In a less textual and more policy-oriented discussion, the court 
stated that not allowing municipal recovery would frustrate CER-
CLA's broad remedial purpose.51 A holding against the municipality 
would mean that even though CERCLA expressly included natu-
ral resources owned by municipalities within the statute's protective 
scope,52 municipalities themselves could not bring suit to recover for 
damages to those resources.53 As the court said: 
[i]t would be anomalous for this far reaching remedial statute to 
give states a cause of action for damages to natural resources 
owned by the State but for it to exclude cities from access to such 
a cause of action while expressly including resources owned by 
local government's within the scope of the protected subject of 
[CERCLA].54 
any other territory or possession over which the United States has jurisdiction." CERCLA, 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(27) (1983). 
45 See Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 667. 
51 See id. 
52 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). Natural resources are defined as, 
[d. 
[lland, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, groundwater, drinking water supplies, and other 
such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise 
controlled by the United States ... any State or local government, any foreign gov-
ernment, any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on 
alienation, any member of an Indian tribe. 
53 See Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666. 
54 [d. 
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Finally, the court supported its holding by noting that CERCLA 
§ 9607(:055 provided that the President or authorized representative 
of the state would act as public trustee to recover for natural resource 
damages.56 From this language, the court concluded that the munici-
pality, which had been acting at the direction of the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection, was acting as an author-
ized representative of the state and should have standing.57 
The only other reported pre-SARA case considering the issue of 
municipal standing under CERCLA's natural resource damages pro-
vision is City of New York v. Exxon Corp. (Exxon 1).58 In Exxon I, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York upheld New York City's standing to bring suit for the contami-
nation of groundwater caused by illegal dumping into city landfills. 59 
Like the Drew Chemical court, this court appealed to the overriding 
purposes of CERCLA, which the court described as the quick and 
effective cleanup of hazardous wastes and the restoration of environ-
mental quality.60 Relying on these purposes, the court rejected an 
"overly literal" reading of the natural resource damages section that 
would have excluded municipal governments from bringing the suit.61 
The court also noted, as had the Drew Chemical court, that because 
CERCLA protected natural resources owned or controlled by local 
governments, it would be at least incongruous that those entrusted 
to manage the public resources could not bring actions to protect and 
restore them.62 
Therefore, prior to the 1986 amendments, municipalities were able 
to recover natural resource damages under CERCLA.63 Although the 
language of CERCLA did not support this position explicitly, courts 
ruled that the purposes of CERCLA were served better by providing 
municipalities with standing.64 Granting municipalities standing to 
recover the costs of destroyed natural resources furthers CERCLA's 
55 CERCLA § 107 provided in part: "[t]he President, or the authorized representative of any 
State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources to recover for such 
damages." CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(00) (1982). 
56 See Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 667. 
57 See id. at 668. 
58 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) [hereinafter Exxon 1]. 
59 See id. at 618-19. 
60 See id. at 619. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See Exxon I, 633 F. Supp at 618-19; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666. 
64 See Exxon I, 633 F. Supp. at 619; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666. 
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purposes of restoring natural resources and remediating contami-
nated sites.65 
IV. SARA AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA and voted to continue the 
use of the Superfund in the SARA.66 Up until then, CERCLA's future 
was in doubt and SARA was accompanied by much debate and the 
possibility of a veto from President Reagan.67 For municipalities seek-
ing to recover for natural resource damages under CERCLA, SARA 
would bring drastic change.68 
A. The Language of SARA 
After the 1986 amendments, municipalities suddenly found them-
selves without standing to bring suit for natural resource damages69 
and for other provisions of CERCLA, such as recovering response 
costs.70 The language of the new natural resource damages provision 
had not changed substantially.71 The definition of "state" had not changed 
at all from its original version.72 Moreover, the definition of "natural 
resources" continued to include those resources "belonging to, man-
aged by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by" 
local governments.73 
65 See Exxon I, 633 F. Supp. at 619; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666. 
66 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75. 
67 See 132 CONGo REC. S14911 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
68 See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. 
69 See, e.g., City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials and Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 652 (N.D. 
Ohio 1993); Mayor & Council of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1049 
(D.N.J. 1993); Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Corp., 755 F. Supp. 469, 475 (D. Mass. 1991). 
70 See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F. Supp 470, 475 (E.D. Mich. 1993); 
City of New York v. Chemical Waste Disposal Corp., 836 F. Supp. 968, 978 (E.D.N.Y.1993); City 
of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D. Ohio 1993); City of Phila. v. Stepan 
Chern. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
71 Compare CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1988) with CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) 
(1982). 
72 Compare CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27) (1982) with CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27) (1988). 
Under CERCLA, before and after SARA, "state" is defined to include, "the several States of 
the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, Ameri-
can Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, 
and any other territory or possession over which the United States has jurisdiction." CERCLA, 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(27). 
73 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). 
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The 1986 amendments did, however, add a method for the state to 
designate public trustees to assess natural resource damages.74 As 
originally enacted, CERCLA called for authorized representatives of 
the state to act as natural resource trustees but did not outline a 
procedure for appointing such trustees.75 Under SARA, the governor 
of each state was charged with choosing an official to act on the 
public's behalf as trustee and to assess damage to natural resources.76 
As discussed in detail below, this change turned out to be significant 
to the courts dealing with standing for municipalities.77 The courts 
interpreted this trustee-appointing mechanism to be the only way a 
municipality could be a natural resource trustee under CERCLA.78 
B. Legislative History of SARA 
An examination of the legislative history of the 1986 amendments 
to CERCLA, although far from conclusive, may shed some light on 
Congress's intent regarding the standing of municipalities under the 
natural resource damages provision.79 The House and Senate bills 
differed in their treatment of municipalities. Furthermore, comments 
from the Senate floor discussing the bill that emerged from the con-
ference committee indicate the intent to include municipalities under 
CERCLA's natural resource damages provision.80 
Looking at the amendments as they developed in both houses of 
Congress, the House of Representatives' version would have changed 
the definition of "state" to exclude specifically municipalities and other 
political subdivisions of a state.81 This change would have had the 
effect of eliminating one of the rationales used by the courts in Mayor 
74 See id. § 9607(f)(2)(B). That § provides: 
Id. 
[t]he Governor of each State shall designate State officials who may act on behalf of 
the public as trustees for natural resources under this chapter ... and shall notify the 
President of such designations. Such State officials shall assess damages to natural 
resources for the purposes of this chapter ... for those natural resources under their 
trusteeship. 
75 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982). 
76 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B). 
77 See, e.g., Mayor & Council of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1050 
(D.N.J. 1993). 
78 See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. 
79 See infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. 
80 See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
8! H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
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of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp. and in Exxon 1.82 In those cases 
the courts had found that a nonexclusive definition of "state" left room 
for an expansion to include municipalities.83 On the other hand, the 
Senate version of the amendments did not reflect this change and the 
definition was left as it stood under existing law.84 The Conference 
Committee chose not to adopt the House version's more restrictive 
definition and explicitly left the matter of interpreting the provision 
to the courts.85 
The Congressional Record that accompanied the Conference Com-
mittee bill, reveals a consensus that involvement from many parties, 
including municipalities, was needed for an effective natural resource 
damages cleanup program.86 As Senator Baucus (D-Mont.) stated, 
"[i]nvolvement of PRP's, and of local citizens, environmental organi-
zations, State and local officials, and any other interested persons, is 
crucial to the success of any natural resource damage assessment 
procedure."87 Senator Baucus went on to talk about the regulations 
governing the assessment of natural resource damages.88 The regula-
tions submitted would be inadequate, the Senator feared, because the 
"Interior Department has ignored the intent of Congress and repeat-
edly erected barriers to the recovery of damages to natural resources."89 
The Senator proclaimed: "[i]t is the intent of CERCLA that natural 
resource damage regulations facilitate natural resource damage claims, 
not block them."90 These comments evidence a desire to allow greater 
access to CERCLA's natural resource damages provisions and do not 
support a more restrictive view of those provisions.91 
82 See Exxon 1,633 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chern. Corp., 
621 F. Supp. 663, 666 (D.N.J. 1985). 
83 See Exxon I, 633 F. Supp. at 613; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666. 
84 See S.51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
85 The statement of the Conference Committee explained: 
Senate amendment-The Senate amendment contains no provision comparable to that 
of the House amendment. House amendment-The House amendment amends section 
101(27) of CERCLA, which is the definition of "State," to exclude units of local gov-
ernment. Conference substitute-The Conference substitute does not include the 
House amendment to the definition of "State," leaving it to the court's interpretation 
of this provision. 
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1986). 
86 See 132 CONGo REC. S14930 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
87Id. 
83 Id. 
89Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See 132 CONGo REC. S14930 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Senator Baucus). 
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Furthermore, there is evidence that at least some members of 
Congress thought that the SARA amendments retained the ability of 
municipalities to sue for natural resource damages.92 Senator Lauten-
berg (D-N.J.), author of several provisions that were included by the 
Conference Committee, stated that the Conference Committee bill 
would "[u]phold the Boonton [Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical 
Corp.] decision allowing municipalitie.s to sue for cost recovery under 
the same Superfund provisions available to States, and to serve as 
trustees for natural resource damages. This provision permits com-
munities to move ahead with cleanup plans of their own."93 This state-
ment is clear support for the Drew Chemical decision allowing mu-
nicipalities to recover for natural resource damages and to engage in 
the cleanup of hazardous sites on their own.94 
Therefore, although the definition of "state" did not change under 
the 1986 amendments, there was a significant change to the natural 
resource damages provision.95 As will be seen, the trustee-appointing 
procedure that was added by SARA has been interpreted by courts 
as the only avenue to standing a municipality has to sue for natural 
resource damages.96 The legislative history of SARA however, argues 
against a restrictive vision of the natural resource damages provi-
sions.97 Congress chose not to change the definition of "state," prefer-
ring instead to leave the interpretation to courts.98 
V. MUNICIPAL STANDING TO SUE FOR NATURAL RESOURCE 
DAMAGES AFTER SARA 
As discussed above, before the 1986 amendments, courts allowed 
municipalities to serve as trustees for natural resources controlled by 
those municipalities.99 The 1986 amendments contained a device through 
which the governor of each state could appoint natural resource trus-
tees.100 Thus, since the amendments, courts have interpreted that 
method of appointing trustees to be the sole method through which 
92 See 132 CONGo REC. S14912 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
!Yil Id. 
94 See id. 
95 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra note 85. 
99 See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text. 
100 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B). 
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an authorized representative of a state could be appointed.lol There-
fore, municipalities could no longer be a natural resource trustee, or 
authorized representative, based solely on their being a municipality 
or having acted at the direction of the state.102 Courts also have 
stressed the lack of a change in the amended definition of "state" to 
allow for the inclusion for municipalities and local governments.103 
These factors have persuaded courts that Congress intended to deny 
local governments standing under the natural resource damages pro-
vision of CERCLA.104 
In the post-SARA cases, courts held that because none of the 
municipalities trying to recover natural resource damages had been 
appointed by the governor of their respective states, the cities did not 
have standing under CERCLA.lo5 The greatest blow to municipalities 
came from United States District Judge Harold Ackerman, author of 
the Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp. decision, who reversed 
himself in Mayor & Council of Rockaway v. Klockner & KlocknerYl6 
In Klockner & Klockner, the borough of Rockaway attempted to 
recover under CERCLA for contamination to its water supply wells 
caused by chemicals leaking from underground storage tanks.107 The 
borough argued that, by virtue of its public official status, it was an 
authorized representative of the state for purposes of CERCLA's 
natural resource damages provision.I08 The United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, in denying the borough stand-
ing, held that only a state official specifically appointed by the gover-
nor could qualify as an authorized representative.109 Therefore, the 
court noted, only appointed state officials have standing to bring an 
action for damage to natural resources.UO Furthermore, the court con-
tinued, the new procedure of appointing an authorized representative 
101 See, e.g., Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 473 (D. Mass. 1991). 
102 See id. 
103 See Mayor& Council of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1049 (D.N.J. 
1993); Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. The amended definition of "state" appears at CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27). 
104 See City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 652 (N.D. Ohio 1993); 
Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. at 1049; Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 475. 
105 See Beazer Materials, 833 F. Supp. at 651-52; Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. 
106 811 F. Supp. at 1039. 
107 See id. at 1043. 
108 See id. at 1048. 
109 See id. at 1049. 
110 See id. Cf City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 197 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) 
[hereinafter Exxon III] (New York City was allowed to proceed as an authorized representative 
of the state in a natural resource damages action. Although the city had not been appointed 
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expressed Congress's intent to centralize decisions regarding natural 
resource damages suits.111 This desire to centralize natural resource 
decisions would seem to have outweighed the purpose of CERCLA 
to clean up and restore the environment.112 
Other courts have echoed the reasoning set forth in Klockner & 
Klockner.113 For example, in City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials and 
Services, Inc., Toledo had attempted to recover for natural resource 
damages stemming from hazardous chemical contamination of land.114 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
held that the plain meaning of the word "state" under CERCLA did 
not include municipalities.115 The court also pointed out that Toledo 
had not used the trustee-appointing mechanism included in SARA to 
support its holding denying Toledo standing.116 The court reasoned 
that an expansive interpretation of the word "state" was needed prior 
to SARA because, since there was no trustee-appointing mechanism, 
that would be the only way a municipality could bring a natural 
resource damages action.l17 Now that the trustee-appointing mecha-
nism was in place however, municipalities could bring such actions, 
but only after being appointed by the Governor.118 Finally, the court 
stated that the legislative history of the 1986 amendments expressed 
Congress's concern with avoiding excessive cleanup activity.119 As the 
court stated, "while CERCLA is a 'far-reaching remedial statute,' its 
legislative history also suggests a concern on the part of Congress 
that unwise and excessive clean-up activity be restrained."120 
An interesting approach was taken by the United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota in Werlein v. United States.121 In 
Werlein, the city of St. Anthony sought to recover under CERCLA's 
natural resource damages provision for damage to the aquifer from 
directly by the governor, the city was appointed by the Commissioner of the New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation who was designated trustee by the governor.). 
111 See Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. at 1049. 
112 See id. 
113 See, e.g., City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials and Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (N.D. 
Ohio 1993); Fox River Grove v. Grayhill Inc., 806 F. Supp. 785, 793 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Town of 
Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472-73 (D. Mass. 1991). 
114 Beazer Materials, 833 F. Supp. at 649. 
115 [d. at 651. 
116 [d. at 650. 
117 [d. at 652; see also Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. 
118 Beazer Materials, 833 F. Supp. at 652; see also Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. 
119 Beazer Materials, 833 F. Supp. at 652. 
120 [d. 
121 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990). 
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which the city obtained its drinking water.l22 A variety of defendants, 
including corporations under contract with the United States Army, 
were alleged to have contaminated the aquifer with chemical dis-
charges, mostly trichloroethylene.123 The court examined the deci-
sions in both Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp. and Exxon 
I but held that the city would not be able to recover for damages to 
the aquifer under CERCLA,124 In reaching its decision, the court 
relied on the plain language of the natural resource damages provi-
sion, which "permits recovery only by the state."125 The court did note 
that the language had been broadened to include municipalities in 
both Drew Chemical and Exxon J.126 However, the court distinguished 
the case before it on the grounds that St. Anthony neither owned nor 
controlled the natural resource involved.127 As the court observed, 
"both the courts in Exxon and Drew Chemical relied on the fact that 
the municipality involved either owned or controlled the natural re-
source at issue."128 Because St. Anthony did not own or manage the 
aquifer, the court would not extend standing to the city.129 This holding 
does, however, imply that had St. Anthony owned or been responsible 
for the management of the aquifer, the case might have come out 
differently. 130 
In summary, after SARA, courts have stressed Congress's addition 
of a trustee-appointing mechanism in the natural resource damages 
provision.131 Except for state or federal governments, the courts rea-
soned that the new method of appointing public trustees was the sole 
method under which a trustee could be appointed.132 Therefore, mu-
nicipalities were denied status as per se public trustees.133 Further-
more, courts noted that the plain language of SARA did not allow for 
inclusion of municipalities as "states."134 Thus, courts concluded that 
122 [d. at 908. 
123 [d. at 890. 
124 [d. at 908-09. 
125 [d. at 910. 
126 Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 910. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. 
129 [d. 
130 See id. 
131 See Mayor & Council of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1049 (D.N.J. 
1993); Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472 (D. Mass 1991). 
1:12 See Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. at 1049; Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. 
133 See Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. at 1049; Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. 
134 See City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 651 (N.D. Ohio 1993); 
Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. 
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cities were precluded from utilizing CERCLA's amended natural re-
source damages provision.135 
VI. THE STANDING OF MUNICIPALITIES UNDER OTHER CERCLA 
PROVISIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
The standing of municipalities under CERCLA provisions other 
than the natural resource damages provision has been mixed.136 In 
attempts to recover response costs, municipalities generally have 
been denied standing to proceed as a "state."137 However, courts have 
held that a city could proceed as a "state" for purposes of entering 
into a settlement under CERCLA.138 Under other federal environ-
mental laws, municipalities have figured most prominently under citi-
zen suit provisions and generally have been granted standing.139 
A. Municipalities and Other CERCLA Provisions 
The pattern in cases concerning municipal standing to proceed as 
a state for the purposes of recovering response costs under CERCLA 
matches the pattern in natural resource damages recovery cases.140 
Response costs are those costs incurred in removing hazardous wastes 
and repairing contaminated sites.141 Although the Mayor of Boonton 
v. Drew Chemical Corp. court held that municipalities could recover 
response costs as a "state" under CERCLA/42 after the 1986 amend-
135 See Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. at 1049-50; Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 472. 
136 See infra notes 150-65 and accompanying text. 
137 See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F. Supp. 470, 474 (E.D. Mich. 1993); 
City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D. Ohio 1993); City of Phila. v. Stepan 
Chern. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
138 See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter 
Exxon II]. 
139 See infra notes 176--83 and accompanying text. 
140 Compare Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chern. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.N.J. 1985) 
(municipality can proceed as a state for recovering response costs) with City of Phila., 713 F. 
Supp. at 1490 (city is not a state for purposes of recovering response costs). 
141 As defined in CERCLA, respond or response, "means remove, removal, remedy, and re-
medial action .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). In turn "remedy" or "remedial action" are defined as: 
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to 
removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so 
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health 
or welfare or the environment. 
Id. § 9601(24). 
142 Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 668. 
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ments, courts have almost unanimously decided against municipali-
ties. l43 The effect of denying a city authority to proceed as a "state" 
under the response costs provision does not, however, foreclose re-
covery entirely under CERCLA.144 Municipalities still can recover 
response costs under CERCLA, if the municipality can prove that the 
steps taken were consistent with the NCP.145 As stated earlier, the 
NCP is the plan promulgated by the EPA containing methods for 
evaluating hazardous substance releases and appropriate remedies.146 
CERCLA § 9607(a)(4) treats parties who take steps to clean up a haz-
ardous site differently. If the state or federal government takes steps to 
clean up a site, they may sue to recover costs under § 9607(a)(4)(A).147 
The government's actions are presumed to be consistent with the 
NCP and the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the 
government's actions were inconsistent with the NCp'l48 On the other 
hand, if anyone else takes steps to clean up a site, they do so under 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) and the burden of proof is on the party seeking to 
recover response costs to show the actions taken were consistent with 
the NCP, and therefore recoverable under CERCLA.149 
In the first case to take up the question of municipalities and re-
sponse costs under § 9607(a)(4)(A), City of Philadelphia v. Stepan 
Chemical Co., the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
143 See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F. Supp. 470, 474 (E.D. Mich. 1993); 
City of New York v. Chern. Waste Disposal Corp., 836 F. Supp. 968, 978 (E.D. N.Y. 1993); City 
of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D. Ohio 1993); City of Phila., 713 F. Supp. 
at 1489--90. 
144 See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 840 F. Supp. at 475. 
145 See, e.g., id. 
146 See supra notes 19--26 and accompanying text. 
147 CERCLA states: 
[a]ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport ... from 
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of 
response costs, of a hazardous substance shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government 
or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
148 See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 746 
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
149 See, e.g., id. CERCLA provides: 
[a]ny person who accepts or accepted hazardous substances for transport to disposal 
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which 
there is a release, or threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, 
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with 
the national contingency plan. 
42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
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trict of Pennsylvania held that municipalities must proceed as a pri-
vate party and not as a "state."150 The court in Stepan Chemical 
held that because "municipality" was not included in the definition of 
"state" it would be against the plain language of CERCLA to allow 
Philadelphia to proceed as a "state" in recovering response costS.151 
Also, the court was unable to find any support in CERCLA's legisla-
tive history for the proposition that Congress intended to allow cities 
to recover response costs as "states."l52 Finally, the court distinguished 
Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp. as dealing primarily with 
natural resource damages, however, natural resource damages were not 
an issue in this case.153 Later cases dealing with the subject of response 
costs found the reasoning of Stepan Chemical to be persuasive.l54 
The reasoning of Drew Chemical was utilized in Exxon II/55 an 
action by the city to proceed as a "state" in entering into a settlement 
under CERCLA.156 On its face, CERCLA's settlement provisions, 
§§ 9613(£)(2)-(3), deal with settlements involving the United States or 
a state.157 A settling party under § 9613 is not liable for claims of 
contribution but may seek contribution from any non-settling party.l58 
Also, if a settling party pays less than its proportionate share of the 
liability in the settlement, the non-settling parties will get stuck pay-
ing the difference.159 Municipalities would want to take advantage of 
this provision because it is designed to bring defendants to the set-
150 City of Phila. v. Stepan Chern. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-90 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
151 [d. at 1488. 
152 [d. at 1489. 
153 [d. at 1489 n.16. 
154 See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F. Supp. 470, 474 (E.D. Mich. 1993); 
City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 
155 697 F. Supp 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
156 See id. at 684. 
157 That section provides: 
[aJ person who has resolved his liability to the United States or a State in an admin-
istrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims of contribution 
regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge 
any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces 
the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement. 
CERCLA,42 U.S.C. § 9613. 
158 [d. 
159 See Exxon II, 697 F. Supp. at 681 n.5. CERCLA provides: 
[ilf the United States or a State has obtained less than complete relief from a person 
who has resolved its liability to the United States or the State in an administrative or 
judicially approved settlement, the United States or the State may bring an action 
against any person who has not so resolved its liability. 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(A). 
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tlement table and to make settlements easier to obtain.160 On the other 
hand, defendants would rather keep unfavorable settlement powers 
as limited as possible.161 
Harkening back to pre-SARA days, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York held in Exxon II that 
the inclusionary definition of "state," as well as the overall purpose of 
CERCLA to protect and preserve public health and the environment, 
supported a broad reading of the statute.162 The court also supported 
its holding by pointing to provisions of CERCLA which give munici-
palities authority to enter into cleanup agreements with the EPA on 
a costsharing basis and provisions allowing Superfund money to be 
used to reimburse local governments for costs of emergency me as-
ures.163 The same court, two years later, held that the City of New 
York could proceed as a "state" for the purposes of recovering re-
sponse costs under CERCLA.164 In so holding, the court relied en-
tirely on its reasoning in Exxon II.165 
As the court in Exxon II pointed out, there are several other 
CERCLA provisions that provide directly for local government par-
ticipation.166 Therefore, CERCLA envisions a role for municipalities 
in the remediation of hazardous sites and this role supports the view 
that they be allowed to recover for natural resource damages.167 For 
example, CERCLA calls for the NCP to include, "roles and responsi-
bilities for the Federal, State, and local governments ... in effectuat-
ing the plan."168 Therefore, the NCP does envision some role for local 
governments.169 In fact, the NCP counts on local governments, along 
with state governments, to participate in response actions and to take 
steps necessary to protect the public.170 CERCLA also provides that 
federal agencies allow local officials to participate in the planning and 
selection of a remedial action where federal facilities are involved in 
a hazardous release.l7l Furthermore, local governments can receive 
reimbursement for temporary emergency measures carried out after 
160 See Exxon II, 697 F. Supp. at 681. 
161 See id. at 683. 
162 See id. at 684-85. 
163 [d. at 685. 
164 City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
165 [d. 
166 Exxon II, 697 F. Supp. at 685. 
167 See id. 
168 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(4). 
169 See id. 
170 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.180(e) (1994). 
171 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(f). 
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a hazardous release.172 There is a $25,000 maximum on what a local 
government can receive for anyone response action.173 Finally, local 
governments may contract or enter into cost-sharing agreements 
with the federal government to carry out any action in response to a 
hazardous substance release.174 A local government that does contract 
with the federal government also would gain the enforcement powers 
necessary to carry out the response action.175 
B. Citizen Suits 
Most federal environmental statutes, including CERCLA, provide 
for citizen enforcement through the use of citizen suits.176 Citizen suits 
are designed to supplement the enforcement responsibilities of fed-
eral, state, and local governments.177 That is, where the responsible 
governments fail to enforce the standards of an environmental law, a 
citizen may step in to make sure the law is enforced.178 For example, 
a citizen may sue anyone, including the United States government, 
for violating National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System per-
mits granted under the Clean Water Act.179 Also, under citizen suit 
provisions a citizen may sue for the enforcement of emission stand-
ards under the Clean Air Act.180 Similarly, a citizen may sue another 
172 CERCLA provides: "[t]he President is authorized to reimburse local community authori-
ties for expenses incurred . . . in carrying out temporary emergency measures necessary to 
prevent or mitigate injury to human health or the environment associated with the release or 
threatened release of any hazardous substance pollutant or contaminant." 42 U.S.C. § 9623(b)(I). 
173 [d. § 9623(c). 
174 [d. § 9604(d)(I)(A). 
175 See id. § 9604(e). 
176 See id. § 9659; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300j-8(d); Noise Control Act of 1972,42 U.S.C. § 4911; Energy Sources Development Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 5851(e); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305; Solid Waste Disposal 
Act,42 U.S.C. § 6972; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604; Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 8435; Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124. 
177 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). 
178 See id. 
179 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). That § provides in part: 
[d. 
[a]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of 
(A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard 
or limitation. 
180 42 U .S.C. § 7604(a). That § provides in part: 
[a]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental 
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citizen or a governmental entity violating a standard or requirement 
of CERCLA.181 In general, municipalities are included as "citizens" 
under federal environmental laws and therefore can sue under the 
citizen suit provisions.182 Despite their power to bring suit under 
citizen suit provisions, however, municipalities rarely have done SO.183 
C. The Clean Water Act and The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
As amended, the CERCLA natural resource damages provision 
provides that designated trustees may assess damages to natural 
resources under both CERCLA and the Clean Water Act.184 Under 
the Clean Water Act § 1321, the President or the authorized repre-
sentative of any state may act as public trustee of natural resources 
and recover the costs of replacing or restoring natural resources 
destroyed by a hazardous discharge.185 To the extent a hazardous 
discharge is oil, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs who may recover 
for natural resource damages.186 The Oil Pollution Act utilizes a sys-
tem of designating state trustees by the Governors similar to that 
used in CERCLA as amended.187 Unlike CERCLA and the Clean 
[d. 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of 
(A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard 
or limitation. 
181 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a). That § provides in part: 
[d. 
[a]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including the United States, and any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, 
requirement, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter. 
182 For example, under CERCLA the term "person" is defined as an "individual, firm, corpo-
ration, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States 
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate 
body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). 
183 See, e.g., Atlantic City Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Regional Adm'r., 803 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(municipal authority brought action under Clean Water Act citizen suit to appeal denial of 
funding for purchase by municipality of sewage treatment facility); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. 
City of Mounds View, 651 F. Supp. 551, 560 (D. Minn. 1987) (city brought citizen's suit under 
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act). 
184 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(2)(B). 
185 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(5). 
186 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2706 (Supp. V 1993). 
187 Compare Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(3) with CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(0(2)(B). 
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Water Act, however, the Oil Pollution Act specifically provides that 
liability is to the state for natural resource damages belonging to, 
managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to political subdivisions of 
a state.l88 The Oil Pollution Act does contemplate municipal involve-
ment in the natural resources area, noting that state and local officials 
are to be designated as natural resource trustees.189 Municipalities 
have not, in their own right, tried to recover natural resource dam-
ages under either the Clean Water Act or the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
and therefore there is no judicial interpretation as to whether munici-
palities may do so. In fact, the bulk of municipal action in the area of 
federal environmental law has been under the various provisions of 
CERCLA.l90 It is therefore reasonable to assume that courts would 
look to CERCLA cases in interpreting cases brought under the Clean 
Water Act or the Oil Pollution Act.191 
In sum, the standing of municipalities under CERCLA provisions 
other than the natural resource damages provision has been mixed. 
Although the recent trend has been to deny municipalities standing 
to recover response costs as a "state," it has been held that munici-
palities could enter into settlements as a "state."l92 Furthermore, 
CERCLA does grant municipalities power to carry out CERCLA's 
objectives in several aspects.193 Also, municipalities would be able to 
sue for enforcement of environmental laws under citizen suit provi-
sions.l94 Finally, while the Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990 also provide for the recovery of natural resource damages, 
municipalities have not attempted recovery under those laws.195 
VII. FOR AND AGAINST MUNICIPAL STANDING 
A. The Case For Municipal Standing 
Despite the usual role of municipalities as defendants in environ-
mental suits, there are distinct advantages to municipal enforcement of 
188 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a)(2). 
189 See id. §§ 2706(b)(3)-(c)(2). 
190 See Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 12 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 50, 74 n.106 (1993). 
191 This is so because CERCLA's natural resources provision provides that appointed trustees 
also may act for purposes of the Clean Water Act. See CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B). 
192 See Exxon II, 697 F. Supp. 677, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
193 See supra notes 168-75. 
194 See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. 
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environmental suits-particularly natural resource suits.l96 In many 
natural resource damages suits, the damage is localized.197 Put another 
way, the damage may be solely within one city or one part of a city.l98 
Similarly, concern over damage is likely to be 10calized.199 It is the 
extraordinary case, such as the Exxon Valdez disaster, that warrants 
widespread notice and action.200 It only makes sense to allow those 
who live nearest a problem, and who have to breathe the air and drink 
the water, to take care of it.201 Because local citizens are so close to 
the problem, they are apt to take action faster than would the more 
distant state and federal governments.202 In fact, the NCP calls for 
local participation in response actions precisely because local citizens 
are so close to the problem and local officials are likely to be first on 
the scene in the event of a hazardous release.203 Additionally, the local 
government probably has fewer demands on its time than do the state 
and federal governments. 
Another advantage of allowing municipal standing is that local 
governments will have increased knowledge of an affected area.204 A 
city is likely to have better knowledge of the history of a site, be more 
familiar with alleged violators, and therefore be in a better position 
to obtain a settlement.205 Although one court has held that a city could 
act as a "state" for purposes of settling a natural resource damages 
suit, the court held so mainly because the city was allowed to bring 
196 See Lehner, supra note 190, at 55. 
197 See, e.g., Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 469-70 (D. Mass 1991); Mayor 
of Boonton v. Drew Chern. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 664--65 (D.N.J. 1985). 
198 See, e.g., City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials and Servs. Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 649 (N.D. 
Ohio 1993); Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp at 469; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 664-65. 
199 See, e.g., Beazer Materials, 833 F. Supp. at 649; Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp at 469; Drew 
Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 664-65. 
200 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 10 (May 10, 1992) (damage assessment studies alone in the disaster 
cost over $100 million). 
201 See Lehner, supra note 190, at 55. 
202 See id. 
203 The NCP provides that: 
[b]ecause state and local public safety organizations would normally be the first gov-
ernment representatives at the scene of a discharge or release they are expected to 
initiate public safety measures that are necessary to protect public health and welfare 
and that are consistent with containment and cleanup requirements in the NCP and 
are responsible for directing evacuations pursuant to existing state and local proce-
dures. 
40 C.F.R. § 300.180(e). 
204 See Lehner, supra note 190, at 58. 
205 See id. 
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the suit in the first place.206 Denying cities standing to bring suit takes 
the settlement advantage away from them and frustrates the intent 
of the SARA amendments to encourage settlements.207 
Allowing municipalities standing also furthers society's desire for 
quick hazardous response and restoration. Instead of having to wait 
for state or federal governments to get around to bringing a natural 
resource damages suit, the local government could bring the suit itself 
and only have to wait on the court's docket.208 The quicker the munici-
pality receives a damages award, the sooner the municipality can 
begin to restore the damage and render the site fit for use.209 The 
money recovered in such a suit must be used in or around the munici-
pality where the damage occurred anyway, because CERCLA com-
mands that the recovery from a natural resources suit be used to 
restore or replace the lost resources.210 
The CERCLA process moves slowly enough without the added 
delay of waiting for state or federal governments to bring natural 
resource damages suits.211 As an example, consider the facts of Mayor 
& Council of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner.212 In March, 1980, 
volatile organic compounds were discovered in the city's drinking 
supply wells and the borough of Rockaway built a treatment system 
to remedy the situation.213 Almost three years later, the EPA placed 
the site on the NPL.214 As explained, the NPL is a list of contaminated 
sites across the country that are ranked according to a system de-
signed to ensure that more hazardous sites are cleaned up first.215 The 
state conducted investigations until 1986, when the EPA indicated 
206 See Exxon II, 697 F. Supp. 677, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
207 See, e.g., United States v. BASF-Inmont Corp., 819 F. Supp. 601, 607 (E.D. Mich. 1993) 
("However, the court believes there is a competing policy at work: the rapid settlement of 
extraordinarily lengthy and expensive CERCLA litigation."); see also In re Achushnet River 
& New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (D. Mass. 1989). 
208 This in itself could take years. See Lehner, supra note 190, at 55. 
209 See id. 
210 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(t)(1). That § provides that recovery under the natural 
resource provision "shall be available for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent 
of such natural resources .... " 
211 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 885 (1992) (There is an average of over 10 years between the discovery and clean 
up of CERCLA sites). 
212 811 F. Supp. 1039 (D.N.J. 1993). 
213 Id. at 1043. 
214Id. 
215 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.1105 App. B. 
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that the treatment system built by the borough was the appropriate 
remedy.216 In 1990, the EPA identified the sources of the pollution but 
did not file suit.217 The next year, the borough filed suit for the recov-
ery of natural resource damages and the case finally was heard in 
1993.218 It took a total of thirteen years from the discovery of the 
contamination to the actual disposition of the suit for an award of 
natural resource damages.219 As of July, 1995, the Rockaway Borough 
Well Field remained on the NPL.220 
In any case, it may be relatively easy for a municipality to be 
designated a natural resources trustee under CERCLA.221 In Exxon 
III, the United States District Court for the District of New York 
held that the city was an authorized trustee because the city depart-
ment of sanitation was delegated the power by the Commissioner of 
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation who 
was designated trustee by the Governor of New York.222 Therefore, it 
may be that as long as the natural resource trustee's power is derived 
in some way from the Governor of the state, that person is an author-
ized trustee under CERCLA.223 
Even though the reasoning of Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical 
Corp. and Exxon I has been all but abandoned, there still remains 
truth in what those decisions held.224 Granting a municipality standing 
to sue as a "state" furthers CERCLA's goal of restoring destroyed 
natural resources.225 As noted earlier, Congress explicitly chose not to 
change the definition of "state" when SARA was passed.226 Congress 
instead preferred to leave interpretation of that provision to courtS.227 
It merits consideration that at the time the 1986 amendments were 
being discussed, courts that had considered the question had been 
interpreting the natural resource damages provision to include cities 
216 Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. at 1043. 
217Id. 
218Id. 
219 See id. 
220 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.1105 App. B. 
221 See generally Exxon III, 766 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
222Id. at 197. 
223 See id. 
224 See Exxon I, 633 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y.1986); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chern. Corp., 
621 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D.N.J. 1985). 
225 Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666. 
226 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1986). 
227 See id. 
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and municipalities.228 This could be taken as congressional approval of 
the interpretation being applied.229 The case becomes stronger when 
one considers the statements made on the Senate floor, favoring an 
expansion of natural resource damages suits and directly supporting 
the Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp. decision.230 Given the 
Conference Committee's comments accompanying the decision not to 
specifically exclude municipalities from the definition of "state," Con-
gress's awareness of courts' interpretation, and the statements made 
on the Senate floor, it is evident that Congress intended to allow 
municipalities standing to sue for natural resource damages.231 
B. The Case Against Municipal Standing 
Along with the fact that CERCLA's language does not directly 
support it, there are problems with municipal enforcement of the 
natural resource damages provision.232 Familiarity is a double-edged 
sword, for although familiarity may facilitate settlements, it also can 
cause local governments to treat a violator leniently or to not file suit 
at all.233 This lesson is especially true because in many, if not most, 
natural resource damages cases the violator will be a local industry.234 
A local government may be less enthusiastic about bringing a suit 
against a local industry.235 It is hard enough for some cities to attract 
industry without having a reputation for being quick to bring suit for 
natural resource damages. If the damages are large, the city threat-
ens to shut the industry down or at least force the industry to layoff 
employees who are more likely than not from the area. This, in turn, 
also threatens the city's tax base. Also, there may be some question 
as to whether municipalities possess the resources necessary to bring 
the suit.236 In hard times, a city is more likely to use funding for 
necessities such as police, fire, and schools than to file lawsuits. Fur-
thermore, the city may lack legal resources.237 That is, there could be 
a decided lack of expertise over environmental matters in the local 
228 See Exxon I, 633 F. Supp. at 613; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 667. 
229 See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1986). 
230 See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
231 See Exxon 1,633 F. Supp. at 618--19; Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. at 666--68. 
232 See Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472-73 (D. Mass. 1991). 
233 See Lehner, supra note 190, at 58. 
234 See 132 CONGo REC. S14908 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bentsen). 
235 See Lehner, supra note 190, at 58. 
236 See Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 473. 
237 See id. at 473 n.6. 
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governments.238 Some courts expressed concern that inconsistent ap-
proaches and results will develop in the natural resources area ad hoc 
and case-by-case, depending on the quality of a city's counsel.239 Un-
less a city is fairly large, the city likely would not have anyone spe-
cializing in environmental concerns who would be equipped to bring 
the suit.240 This lack of resources is in contrast to state and federal 
governments that have departments devoted entirely to environ-
mental affairs.241 The lack of expertise may force a municipality to hire 
outside counsel at an increased expense.242 Faced with mounting costs, 
for which the municipality may not have funding, the municipality 
may decide to defer to the state or federal governments.243 
In particular, courts have noted one disadvantage regarding mu-
nicipal enforcement of natural resource damages under CERCLA: the 
lack of centralization municipal enforcement would involve.244 The 
concern is that natural resource damages claims will become subject 
to the "parochial views of a state's political subdivision" and a flood of 
actions will result.245 This fear ties into the concern with developing a 
consistent approach to natural resource damages because this area of 
litigation is still very much undefined and unsettled.246 Arguably, lim-
iting standing to state and federal governments will lower the number 
of natural resource damages suits and will facilitate control of the 
development of this area of law.247 
C. Recommendation 
Municipalities have the incentive to bring suits for natural resource 
damages quickly.248 Allowing municipal suits could mean cutting down 
on the time it takes to restore sites lost to contamination.249 Munici-
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See Lehner, supra note 190, at 52. 
241 For example, the State of Michigan Department of Attorney General has a division for 
Environmental Protection and a separate division for Natural Resources. 
242 See Lehner, supra note 190, at 52. 
243 [d. 
244 See Mayor & Council of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1049 (D.N.J. 
1993); Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 473 (D. Mass. 1991). 
245 See Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. at 473. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 211-20 and accompanying text. 
1996] RECOVERY OF DAMAGES 947 
palities also may be in a better position to obtain information concern-
ing a contaminated site and to settle natural resource damages suits.250 
Although municipalities may chose not to bring suit against local 
industry if to do so would hurt local employment, eventually the state 
or federal government would take action.251 No one is arguing that 
only municipalities should be able to bring natural resource damages 
suits. There is also doubt as to whether municipalities possess the 
resources, monetary or legal, to bring natural resource damages suits.252 
However, those municipalities lacking resources could defer to the 
state or federal government. Some courts would limit standing in 
natural resource cases in order to develop a consistent approach to 
the issue of natural resource damages.253 This argument loses force 
when one realizes that anyone authorized by the Governor as a public 
trustee may bring suit and that there is no limit to the number of 
people or municipalities that can be so designated.254 Furthermore, it 
may be that a trustee need not directly be appointed by the Governor, 
but rather, can gain trustee status by having the power delegated by 
a directly appointed trustee.255 Courts also want to avoid a lack of 
centralization in natural resource damages cases.256 However, as stated 
above, natural resource damages cases may be a decidedly parochial 
concern.257 Municipal officials, who have to live with the contaminated 
site and deal with the citizens who want something done about it, 
should be given the option of repairing the site entirely, including 
restoring lost natural resources.258 Furthermore, the fear that allow-
ing municipalities to recover for natural resource damages will lead 
to an uncontrollable flood of cases is undercut by the fact that even 
when courts granted municipalities standing, there were only two 
reported cases where municipalities brought suit.259 When one also 
takes into account the supportive legislative history of SARA, it is 
250 See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text. 
254 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B). 
255 Exxon III, 766 F. Supp. 177, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
256 See Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 473 (D. Mass 1991). 
257 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
258 See generally Lehner, supra note 190. 
259 See Exxon I, 633 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y.1986); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chern. Corp., 
621 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D.N.J. 1985). 
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clear that municipalities should be allowed to sue for natural resource 
damages in their own right.260 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the enactment of the 1986 amendments, municipalities 
were able to recover under CERCLA's natural resource damages 
provisions. However, courts since have moved in the opposite direc-
tion and have denied standing to municipalities, relying on essentially 
the same language but with the addition of an avenue of appointing 
authorized representatives.261 There is evidence, however, that Con-
gress did not intend such a change. On the contrary, some members 
of Congress understood that municipalities would continue to be able 
to recover natural resource damages under CERCLA as amended in 
1986.262 
Should cities and municipalities be granted standing to bring natu-
ral resource damages suits they would have distinct advantages over 
their federal and state government counterparts.263 Local govern-
ments have the incentive to file suit as soon as practicable because 
local governments are the ones who have to deal with the problem on 
a daily basis. This would cut down on the time delay in getting a 
damaged area restored. Also, local governments would be more famil-
iar with an area damaged and with the parties involved. 
However, there are drawbacks to allowing local governments to file 
suit for natural resource damages under CERCLA.264 Most notable is 
the local government's lack of expertise in the field of environmental 
law. If the violator is a local industry, a municipality may be wary of 
bringing suit for fear of damaging its present and future tax base and 
employment opportunities. Also, the local government simply may 
not have the resources available to bring the suit. Finally, there is a 
general fear of a multitude of remedies and results in natural resource 
damages cases since this an area of law not yet fully defined. 
In summary, the advantages of allowing municipalities to bring 
CERCLA natural resource damages claims outweigh the disadvan-
tages. Municipalities could further the goals of CERCLA by quickly 
bringing natural resource damages suits and restoring sites damaged 
260 See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 232-47 and accompanying text. 
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by hazardous substance releases. Society is demonstrating an ever-
increasing concern for the loss of natural resources, and stronger 
remedies are needed to address this concern. Allowing municipalities 
standing to recover for natural resource damages under CERCLA 
would be a beginning. There is little to lose and so much to gain. 
